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THE HONORABLE SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON*
Judicial independence is a concept that forms the very foundation of our judicial
system. This article discusses judicial independence from the perspectives of the
judge, the litigant, and the spectator, describing why each values a judge's ability
to perform his or her duties in a fair and impartial manner. The article then
-discusses some of the many threats to judicial independence, as well as the
traditional and institutional safeguards that help to maintain an independent
judiciary.
President Kirwan, Ms. Patterson, Chief Justice Moyer, Chief Justice Phillips,
and distinguished faculty and participants in this conference entitled "Perspectives
on Judicial Independence": I take the title of the conference as the theme of my
remarks. I will speak about a few of the many perspectives on judicial
independence. These are perspectives that intersect and interact, that must be
weighed and balanced, and that present different challenges that perhaps call for
different resolutions.
America has valued judicial independence since before the formation of the
country. The American Revolution, a fight for national independence, was also a
fight for judicial independence. Among the list of grievances justifying the
American Revolution, the Declaration of Independence charged King George I
with obstructing the administration of justice "by refusing his Assent to Laws for
establishing judiciary powers"' and with making judges "dependent on his Will
alone, for the tenure of their offices, and the amount and payment of their
salaries." 2
But judicial independence is more than the creation of a judiciary or tenure
and salaries. Although the phrase is hard to define, the term "judicial
independence" embodies the concept that a judge decides cases fairly, impartially,
and according to the facts and law, not according to whim, prejudice, or fear, the
dictates of the legislature or executive, or the latest opinion poll. At times, judicial
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1THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE pars. 14 (U.S. 1776).
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independence means making unpopular decisions, whether unpopular with the
legislative or executive branch, the public, or judicial colleagues.
Judges make choices; by definition they exercise judgment. Not all judges
reason alike or necessarily reach the same result even when presented with the
same facts and the same law. If judges did not use judgment, they could be
replaced by computers, which, when given the facts and law, would churn out an
answer. Nevertheless, judicial independence does not mean that the judge is a
loose cannon on the deck ofjustice, shooting in any direction he or she wishes.
Judicial independence is a means to an end-a fair trial according to the law.3
The state constitutions and the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S.
Constitution guarantee the right to an impartial judge in criminal and civil cases.
And these guarantees of impartiality are the legal backbone of judicial
independence.
Judicial independence must, however, be balanced against and paired with
other values, namely, accountability and responsibility. All government officials
are accountable. But to whom are judges accountable and for what?
Judges are accountable to explain their decisions and make these
explanations available to the litigants, the public, the academy, fellow judges, and
the media.
The judicial branch is responsible for processing cases expeditiously, offering
everyone equal access to justice, and requiring judges and court personnel to be
courteous and helpful. The judicial branch is responsible for administering justice
free of discrimination. The judicial branch is responsible for spending its
appropriations prudently and in accordance with sound fiscal practices. The
judicial branch must give the bar and the public an opportunity to express their
views about the system and to participate in the system through citizen boards and
committees and volunteer programs.
With these principles in mind, I speak of five perspectives on judicial
independence:
(1) the judge's perspective;
(2) the litigant's perspective;
(3) the spectator's perspective;
(4) threats to judicial independence; and
(5) safeguards for judicial independence.
The sixth perspective will be that of the participants in this conference and the
reader.
The face ofjudicial independence changes according to one's vantage point. I
will start by speaking about a judge's perspective on judicial independence. The
3 See Randall T. Shepard, Campaign Speech: Restraint and Liberty in Judicial Ethics, 9
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1059, 1083-84 (1996).
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judge's perspective is an important one, because it is the judge alone who
exercises judicial independence. 4
Although all judges are expected to decide cases in a fair and impartial
manner, judges work in different jurisdictions and in different roles. Regardless of
these differences, judges are held to standards of judicial independence. The
threats to that independence, however, and the means of preserving judicial
independence may vary from one type of judge to another.
For example, I am an elected justice of my state's highest court, with a term
of 10 years. I am a veteran of three contested, non-partisan elections, the last one
being the most expensive judicial election in Wisconsin's history. That certainly
gives me a perspective!
Other judges are appointed to the bench, particularly federal judges.
We are judges in the judicial branch of government. Still other judges work in
the executive branch of state and federal governments. These judges, often called
administrative judges, hearing officers, or examiners, work in administrative
agencies and handle claims in such matters as social security, worker's
compensation, and employment and housing discrimination.
These executive branch judges probably outnumber judges in the judicial
branches of the state and federal governments. 5 These judges have their own
perspective on judicial independence. They face unique challenges to their
impartiality and judicial integrity. For example, immigration courts are attached to
the U.S. Department of Justice, the prosecuting arm of the government, and
immigration judges make significant, life-altering decisions. Th National
Association of Immigration Judges is complaining that the Justice Department is
attempting to influence the decision-making of immigration judges.6
We cannot think only of American judges. We live in a global society.
Judges in other nations also face challenges to their independence. In too many
countries around the world, there is telephone justice: a telephone call directs the
4 For one judge's personal perspective on judicial independence, see Harlington Wood, Jr.,
Judges'Forum No. 2: "Real Judges", 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURv. AM. L. 259 (2001) (concluding
that judicial independence is essential for impartial decision-making).
The literature on judicial independence is voluminous. For a bibliography relating to the
subject, see Amy B. Atchison et al., Judicial Independence and Judicial Accountability. A
Selected Bibliography, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 723 (1999). For a selected bibliography, see Shirley
S. Abrahamson, Remarks of the Hon. Shirley S. Abrahamson Before the American Bar
Association Commission on Separation of Powers and Judicial Independence, Washington,
D.C., Dec. 13, 1996, 12 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 69, 88-91 (1996).
5 Judith Resnik, Commentary, Judicial Independence and Article III: Too Little and Too
Much, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 657, 659 (1999); Judith Resnik, "Uncle Sam Modernizes His
Justice": Inventing the Federal District Courts of the Twentieth Century for the District of
Columbia and the Nation, 90 GEO. L.J. 607, 612-21 (2002) [hereinafter Resnik, "Uncle Sam
Modernizes His Justice'].
6 Jason Hoppin, INS Judges Seek Independence: They Share Bosses with US. Lawyers,
NAT'L L.J., Mar. 4, 2002, at Al.
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judge how to rule on a case. Many countries are rejecting this way of conducting
judicial business and are attempting to emulate our judicial system. Indeed, our
judicial system is one of our most important exports.
Furthermore, judicial independence has been strongly emphasized by
international organizations as a key to safeguarding human rights. The United
Nations, which regularly assists countries in establishing systems of justice, set
forth standards for achieving an independent judiciary in its Basic Principles on
the Independence of the Judiciary, which were adopted in 1985.7 Both the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights enumerate an independent judiciary as an essential element
for protecting human rights.8 In fostering judicial independence in our country we
must keep in mind and be guided by intemational norms.9 "Global" is the key
word in this decade.
A second perspective from which to view judicial independence is that of a
litigant. A litigant is in court to resolve an important dispute, be it about family
matters, personal liberty, employment, property rights, or privacy. For example,
an airport scanner has been developed that is a "virtual strip search," producing a
very graphic picture of your naked body.10 With advancing technology, litigants
will increasingly look to the courts to protect against invasions of privacy.
Let's be honest here. Most litigants would prefer a judge who is partial to
them and their case. Each litigant might wish to have an unfair advantage for
himself or herself.
But this kind of "self-serving behavior [is] intolerably risky."I Litigants
cannot know whether they or the opposing side will have the greater clout to get a
partial judge. So, because a litigant is unsure who the partial judge would favor,
the litigant must choose the next best alternative, namely, a neutral, fair, impartial
judge. From the perspective of a litigant's self-interest, judicial independence is
the best approach.
Which brings us to a third perspective from which to view judicial
independence-the standpoint of the public. Most people are not personally
involved in litigation. They watch the courts as spectators. Of course, what they
watch is mostly "Judge Judy" and "Law & Order."
7 Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, 7th U.N. Cong. on the Prevention
of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, at 59, U.N. Doc. A/CONF, 121/22iRev. 1 (1986).
8 See Linda Camp Keith, Judicial Independence and Human Rights Protection Around the
World, 85 JUDICATURE 195,195 (2002).
9 Courts have recognized the wisdom of looking to intemational norms for guidance. See,
e.g., Sterling v. Cupp, 625 P.2d 123, 130-31 & n.21 (Or. 1981) (citing international standards
for treatment of prisoners).
10 Mark Hansen, No Place to Hide, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1997, at 44,46.
11 John Ferejohn, Independent Judges, Dependent Judiciary: Explaining Judicial
Independence, 72 S. CAL. L. REv. 353,367 (1999).
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But spectators, like the litigants, are interested in judicial independence
because a system for fair, impartial, peaceful resolution of disputes is more likely
to bring about a just result. Judicial independence, they know, furthers legal;
constitutional, and democratic values and the rule of law.
A fair, impartial, and peaceful system to resolve disputes ensures the public
an orderly society in which to live. Even when a decision is unpopular, the people
will ordinarily abide by a judicial decision when they have confidence that the
judiciary is a fair and impartial body.
Indeed we must conclude, from any of these three perspectives-judge,
litigant, or public-that judicial independence is for the protection of litigants and
the public, not for the protection of the judge.
An excellent example of these three perspectives on judicial independence
and their interdependence occurred at the February 2002 Olympics, where we
saw the results of partisan judging. As you know, Olympic figure skaters work
hard for four years to prepare for three to four minutes of competition. They count
on fair and honest judging and getting the medal they deserve. Rigging the
outcome is disastrous for the judges and robs the competitors and the spectators of
fair matches and a just result.
The Olympics in Salt Lake were a very smooth operation except for an
alleged judging impropriety. 12 As you will recall, the Canadian figure-skating
pair lost the gold medal to the Russians by a 5-4 vote. The French judge (a 15-
year veteran in international judging) cast her vote for the Russians. But she
apparently later announced at a routine, post-competition judges' meeting that she
had been pressured by a French sports official to vote for the Russians in a vote-
swapping deal. The reported deal was for her to assure a victory for the Russian
figure-skating pair and the Russian judge would vote for the French in the next
ice-dancing competition. In the ice-dancing competition no French judge sat and
no Russian was expected to contend for the gold, making it possible to do the
vote-swapping deal.
The French judge wound up in tears, felt she was under siege, and was
suspended, with further investigation to follow. The International Skating Union
threw out the French judge's vote four days later, and the Canadian team was
given an unprecedented second gold medal.
This incident caused widespread distrust of the competitions and opened a
Pandora's box of other countries' disputing rulings, calls, and drug test results.
Imagine living with a judicial system that was subject to similar doubts and
distrust. Chaos and corruption would ensue.
12 For a media report of the incident, see Selena Roberts, Canadian Skaters Awarded
Share of Olympic Gold; French Judge Suspended, Her Scoring Thrown Out, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb.
16, 2002, at Al.
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The Olympics controversy points us to the fourth perspective from which to
view judicial independence, namely, the many threats judicial independence
faces.
Threats to judicial independence are not new. They have historically come
from the executive and legislative branches. The legislative or executive branch
of government may become unhappy with judicial decisions and try to influence
judicial outcomes directly or indirectly.
For example, President Thomas Jefferson attempted to impeach U.S.
Supreme Court Justice Samuel Chase because Chase enforced the Sedition Act.'
3
During the Civil War era Congress apparently manipulated the size of the U.S.
Supreme Court to ensure a favorable ruling on wartime legal tender legislation.'
4
Congress also took away the Court's jurisdiction in a pending case to avoid a
constitutional challenge to the Civil War Reconstruction legislation. 15 During the
1930s, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt tried to increase the size of the U.S.
Supreme Court to pack the court with appointees friendly to New Deal
legislation. 16 Later still, the unpopularity of the Warren Court's civil rights and
criminal justice decrees in the 1960s sparked demands for the impeachment of
Chief Justice Earl Warren.17
Threats from the legislative and executive branches continue, sparked by
decisions on such issues as reapportionment, school funding, reproduction rights,
gun control, tort reform, and affirmative action. Judges must continue to decide
these cases even though the decisions may have significant repercussions for the
judicial branch as an institution. The three branches of government are separate
and equal branches, but the branches are interdependent. Will the legislature or
executive respond to a judicial decision by refusing to increase the number of
judgeships needed to keep up with increasing caseloads? By refusing to appoint
judges? By refusing to increase judicial compensation? By refusing to fund
courthouses and staff?
In more recent years, another threat to judicial independence has come from
non-governmental groups. Using political, social, and economic resources,
powerful non-governmental groups are attempting to influence judicial decision-
making by influencing the selection and retention of judges. The danger is that
13 For an account and analysis of this incident, see WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, GRAND
INQUESTS: THE HISTORIC IMPEACHMENTS OF JUSTICE SAMUEL CHASE AND PRESIDENT ANDREW
JOHNSON (1992).
14 For a brief summary of this event, see Jack M. Balkin, Bush v. Gore and the Boundary
Between Law and Politics, I 10 YALE L.J. 1407, 1448-49 (2001).
15 Bruce Fein & Burt Neubome, Why Should We Care About Independent and
Accountable Judges?, 84 JUDICATURE 58, 59 (2000).
16 For a brief summary of this event, see STEPHEN E. FRANTZICH & STEPHEN L. PERCY,
AMERICAN GOVERNMENT: THE POLrrICAL GAME 449 (1994).
17 See generally William G. Ross, Attacks on the Warren Court by State Officials: A Case
Study of Why Court-Curbing Movements Fail, 50 BUFF. L. REv. 483 (2002).
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when individuals or groups are highly organized, ideologically driven, and well-
funded, their self-interest in winning cases overcomes their interest in an
independent judiciary. How do we keep the influence of these special interests in
check and yet protect everyone's rights of free speech and association? These are
the challenges we face.
For some, judicial elections themselves are a significant threat to judicial
independence. 18 Over 80% of state trial and appellate judges are elected by the
people,' 9 and most state judges have limited terms, some as little as four years. 20
Without a doubt, campaigns have become nastier, noisier, and costlier than ever
before.
How can elected judges remain impartial and rule on minority interests when
they depend on the majority of the electorate to stay in office? How can elected
judges remain impartial when they are dependent on certain groups or persons for
financial support at election time?
Campaigning takes a judge away from judging. Judges must court voters who
are apathetic. Campaign speech may call into question a candidate's future
independence in a particular case or on a particular issue.21 Raising funds to meet
increasing campaign costs adversely affects the public's and judges' perception of
judicial independence. I support the elective judicial system in Wisconsin,
although I recognize that the elective process poses difficulties. 22 In exercising
judicial independence, the stakes for the judges, that is, the loss of the judgeship,
are clearly higher for judges with limited terms than they are for appointed judges
with life tenure.
On the other hand, many believe the appointive system for selecting judges
has also become a significant threat to decisional judicial independence. In the
federal system some judges are appointed by the President "with the Advice and
Consent of the Senate"2 3 and "shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour,"24
18 "If the State has a problem with judicial impartiality, it is largely one the State brought
upon itself by continuing the practice of popularly electing judges." Republican Party of Minn.
v. White, 122 S. Ct. 2528,2544 (2002) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
19 AM. BAR ASS'N, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE TASK FORCE ON LAWYERS'
POLrrICAL CONTRIBuTIONS: PART TWO 3 n. 1 (1998); Roy A. Schotland, Comment, Judicial
Independence and Accountability, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 149, 154-55 (1998).20 See, e.g., ARIz. CONST. art. 6, § 12; COLO. CONST. art. 6, § 16; GA. CONST. art. 6, § 7,
I; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 20-3006 (2001).
21 In discussing free speech of candidates for judicial offices, Justice Kennedy suggests
that states with an elected judiciary may wish to "adopt recusal standards more rigorous than
due process requires and censure judges who violate these standards." White, 122 S. Ct. at 2545
(Kennedy, J., concurring).
22 Abrahamson, supra note 4, at 76.
23 U.S. CONST. art. Hl, § 2.
2 4 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
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that is, for life. Nevertheless, many other federal judges, namely bankruptcy and
magistrate judges, are appointed by federal judges themselves for limited terms.25
The threat here is that the appointive system has increasingly turned into a
search for people with particular views about the law. Litmus tests abound.26
Yet another threat to judicial independence is intimidation of judges by
vitriolic criticism and physical violence. For example, federal district court Judge
Harold Baer was criticized by President Clinton and presidential candidate Robert
Dole and threatened with impeachment for suppressing evidence in a particularly
high-profile drug case. 27 A campaign controversy highlighting a notorious capital
case ended the judicial career of Tennessee Supreme Court Justice Penny
White.28
Judges have been threatened by fear of physical harm. Judges in divorce,
domestic violence, and criminal courts sometimes must live under police
protection. At a minimum, judges must be assured that they and their families are
physically safe regardless of the decisions the judges make. Increased security
measures have become necessary and visible in courthouses across the country.29
The threats abound. But there are also ways to safeguard and bolster judicial
independence-which leads me to the fifth and final perspective (at least from me
today) from which to view judicial independence. Fortunately, there are
traditional and institutional protections for judicial independence.
Judges are constrained to maintain judicial independence by the law, their
legal training, their expectations, and the judicial culture. The judicial culture and
judicial education treasure intellectual honesty, fair and principled decisions, and
rising above partisanship and the political moment. Peer pressure fosters judicial
independence.
Judicial independence is also safeguarded by statutes and ethical codes
requiring judges to conform to high standards and to disqualify themselves from
sitting on cases in which their impartiality would be questioned. Judicial
25 Resnik, "Uncle Sam Modernizes His Justice ", supra note 5, at 674.
26 For a discussion of threats to judicial independence by appointment of judges, see
Shirley S. Abrahamson, The Ballot and the Bench, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 973,987-91 (2001).
27 For discussions of the Judge Baer controversy, see, for example, Stephen B. Bright,
Political Attacks on the Judiciary: Can Justice Be Done Amid Efforts to Intimidate and Remove
Judges from Office for Unpopular Decisions?, 72 N.Y.U. L. REv. 308, 310-11 (1997); Francis
J. Larkin, The Variousness, Virulence, and Variety of Threats to Judicial Independence,
JUDGES' J., Winter 1997, at 4, 6-7; Jon 0. Newman, The Judge Baer Controversy, 80
JUDICATURE 156 (1997).
28 For discussions of the Penny White campaign, see, for example, Bright, supra note 27,
at 310; Traciel V. Reid, The Politicalization of Retention Elections: Lessons from the Defeat of
Justices Lanphier and White, 83 JuDIcATuRE 68 (1999).29 See, e.g., Wisconsin Courthouse Security Manual (Nov. 2000) (available from the
Wisconsin Supreme Court, Madison, Wis.).
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discipline commissions and the courts can discipline judges for violations of these
codes.
Despite these and other safeguards, we must recognize that we rely on the
character of the judge. A judge needs courage. Judges with courage resist threats
to judicial independence and actively advocate judicial independence. Those
lacking courage should neither apply nor run for the office. We must foster a
culture that supports and rewards courageous judges.
In the long and short run, the basic and most important underlying safeguard
for judicial independence is public support for judicial independence. We must
develop the public's understanding of, respect for, and confidence in the concept
ofjudicial independence. We must act now while the public retains confidence in
courts.
But earning that confidence and respect is a many-faceted process. The
people must first understand the court system. Judges and lawyers must work
with the public to help them become better informed about the work of the courts
and to demonstrate the value ofjudicial independence.
The public must also have direct involvement in the work of the justice
system. The public must have an opportunity to express its concerns, criticisms,
and suggestions. Giving the users of the system opportunities for involvement in
the courts does not impede judicial independence. On the contrary, only with
public support for an independent judiciary can the judiciary be truly independent.
That is why this conference is so important. It brings together the bench, the
bar, the academy, and the public. The League of Women Voters' co-sponsorship
and the local community's involvement signal that public interest in judicial
independence is growing. This conference is further evidence that a grassroots
movement is spreading across the country.
The chief justices of many states and the National Center for State Courts
have come together since the 2000 elections to grapple with the growing threats
to judicial elections. On February 14, 2002, a new campaign for fair and impartial
courts was launched, called "The Justice at Stake Campaign." It is a nationwide,
nonpartisan partnership of more than thirty judicial, legal, and citizen
organizations, including the American Judicature Society, the Brennan Center,
the American Bar Association, the League of Women Voters Judicial
Independence Project, the Ohio League of Women Voters, Ohio Citizen Action,
Wisconsin Citizen Action, and the Wisconsin Democracy Campaign.30
Together these groups are working to educate the public and institute reforms
to keep partisan politics and special interests out of the courtroom. It is a goal
worth fighting for-whatever your perspective on judicial independence.
30 Justice at Stake Campaign, 717 D St., NW Suite 203, Washington, D.C. 20004, at
http://www.justiceatstake.org (last visited Dec. 28, 2002).
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Please allow me to be provincial and close with the words of Edward Ryan at
the 1846 Wisconsin constitutional convention: "The office of the judiciary is
interpretation and interpretation cannot be a representative function.... [T]he
judiciary represents no man, no majority, no people. It represents the written law
of the land.... It holds the balance, and weighs right between man and man,
between the rich and the poor, between the weak and the powerful." 31
Shirley S. Abrahamson, C.J., concurs.
31 THE CONVENTION OF 1846, at 594 (Milo M. Quaife ed., 1919).
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